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A CANADIAN SOLUTION: RECENT  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF  
DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN THE CONTEXT OF  
FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED CORPORATIONS  
CARINA NEUMUELLER†
ABSTRACT
The law of directors’ duties in Canada has traditionally not been very 
concerned with creditors’ interests.  In the context of corporations who 
are nearing insolvency, the prevailing view is that the directors owe 
WKHLUÀGXFLDU\GXW\WRWKHFRPSDQ\DVDZKROH7KDWRIFRXUVHEHJVWKH
question of “who is the company?”  Other commonwealth countries have 
GHYHORSHG VLJQLÀFDQW SURWHFWLRQV IRU FUHGLWRUV DQGZLWK WKH 6XSUHPH
Court of Canada decision in Peoples v. Wise, Canada has effectively 
caught up and surpassed other countries in this regard.  The decision 
PDGHFOHDUWKDWGLUHFWRUVRIDÀQDQFLDOO\XQVWDEOHFRPSDQ\RZHDGXW\
to other stakeholders in the corporation besides shareholders, but this 
GXW\ LV QRW ÀGXFLDU\ LQ QDWXUH  ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH RSSUHVVLRQ UHPHG\
located in the Canada Business and Corporations Act, is ample means 
by which creditors interests will receive protection, while it also ensures 
that directors’ discretionary decisions will not be subject to unlimited 
liability.
† Carina Neumueller (LL.B., University of Trier) is currently enrolled in the LL.M. program at 
Dalhousie Law School. She would like to thank Professor Khimji for his help with this paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
7KHLVVXHRIGLUHFWRUV·OLDELOLW\ZLWKUHJDUGWRÀQDQFLDOO\WURXEOHGFRU-
porations has been the subject of debate in recent years. Unlike the 
judiciary in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, Canadian courts have 
traditionally been less willing to consider creditors’ interests. The 1998 
decision of Greenberg J. of the Quebec Superior Court in Peoples De-
partment Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise signalled a new direction for 
Canadian jurisprudence.1 The decision was considered controversial, 
and the appeal was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004.2 The 
central issue considered was whether directors owe a duty to creditors 
when a corporation is on the brink of insolvency. If so, is this duty an 
DVSHFWRIWKHWUDGLWLRQDOÀGXFLDU\GXW\ZKLFKGLUHFWRUVRZHWRWKHFRP-
pany as a whole? Or it is an independent, positive duty owed directly to 
creditors? These questions had to be answered in light of the existence 
of the oppression remedy, which, in contrast to other Commonwealth 
MXULVGLFWLRQVSURYLGHVVLJQLÀFDQWSURWHFWLRQIRUFRUSRUDWHFUHGLWRUV LQ
Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada restated that, even when a cor-
SRUDWLRQLVLQ´WKHQHEXORXVYLFLQLW\RILQVROYHQF\µWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\
under section 122 (1) (a) of the Canada Business Corporations Act3 
remains intact. In sum, the corporations’ interests are not to be confused 
ZLWKWKHLQWHUHVWVRILWVFUHGLWRUV7KLVGHFLVLRQFODULÀHGWKHLVVXHOLIWLQJ
the fog and establishing a uniquely Canadian approach which is distinct 
from the popular Commonwealth approach.
7KLVSDSHUFRQWDLQVÀYHSDUWV7KHÀUVWSDUWLVDJHQHUDORYHUYLHZRI
GLUHFWRUV·ÀGXFLDU\GXWLHVDQGWKHVHFRQGSDUWH[DPLQHVWKHLPSDFWRI
insolvency on those duties. The third part reviews the Commonwealth 
case law, and the fourth part contrasts this case law with Canadian juris-
prudence, in particular the PeoplesGHFLVLRQ7KHÀQDOVHFWLRQSURSRVHV
that the oppression remedy is a workable solution.  This is an approach 
which should not be interpreted as a defeat of creditors’ interests; rather, 
it is an approach which successfully balances creditor protection on the 
one side and the viability of directors’ decision-making on the other.
1 (1998), 23 C.B.R. (4th) 2004, [1998] Q.J. No. 3571, [1999] R.R.A. 178, 23 C.B.R. (4th) 2004. 
[Peoples (QSC) cited to C.B.R.].
2 Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68. 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564, 326 
N.R. 267, J.E. 2004 - 2016, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples (SCC) cited to D.L.R.].
3 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, as am. [CBCA]. 
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II. DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
:KLOHPDQDJLQJWKHFRPSDQ\GLUHFWRUVDUHVXEMHFWWRDÀGXFLDU\GXW\
This duty of loyalty has been developed by the common law courts, but 
LVQRZFRGLÀHG4 in section 122 (1) (a) of the Canadian Business Corpo-
rations Act (CBCA) which reads:
122(1)(a) >H@YHU\GLUHFWRUDQGRIÀFHURIDFRUSRUDWLRQLQH[HUFLVLQJ
their powers and discharging their duties shall…act honestly and in 
good faith with a view to the best interest of the corporation.
7KHÀGXFLDU\GXW\LVD´JHQHUDOVWDQGDUGRIEHKDYLRXULPSRVHGRQGL-
UHFWRUVDQGRIÀFHUVLQUHODWLRQWRWKHLUGHDOLQJVZLWKDQGRQEHKDOIRI
the corporation.”5 This duty is owed to the corporation itself rather than 
to the shareholders directly, and it covers all aspects of the directors’ 
relationship with the corporation.67KHREMHFWLYHRIWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\
is to deter directors from putting their own interests before those of the 
corporation. Entrusted with the large task of managing the assets of the 
FRUSRUDWLRQ WKHGLUHFWRUVDUHREOLJHGE\ WKHLUÀGXFLDU\GXW\ WRDFW LQ
good faith. In most of the cases where a breach of the duty is found, the 
ÀGXFLDU\KDVPDGHVRPHSURÀWDWWKHH[SHQVHRIWKHFRUSRUDWLRQDQGD
diversion of assets has occurred.7 
Due to the high degree of power and control that directors exer-
cise over the company and given that there is a constant opportunity to 
engage in self-interested activity, directors are held to the strictest of 
duties.8 A contractual duty would not be desirable or feasible, as share-
holders cannot be expected to negotiate contracts for themselves at the 
time of each investment. Likewise, a regular duty of care would not pro-
YLGHDVXIÀFLHQWOHYHORISURWHFWLRQIRUVKDUHKROGHUVDJDLQVWWKHVLJQLÀ-
4 )RU EDFNJURXQG LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH FRGLÀFDWLRQ RI WKHÀGXFLDU\ UHODWLRQVKLS VHH JHQHUDOO\
Carol Hansell, 'LUHFWRUVDQG2IÀFHUVLQ&DQDGD/DZDQG3UDFWLFHvol. 2 (Toronto: Carswell, 
1999) at 9-14. 
5 J. Anthony Van Duzer, The Law of Partnerships and Corporations, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2004) at 270. 
6 Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421. 
7 Ibid. at 273. See also Edward M. Iacobucci, “A Wise Decision? An Analysis of the Relation-
VKLSEHWZHHQ&RUSRUDWH2ZQHUVKLS6WUXFWXUHDQG'LUHFWRUV·DQG2IÀFHUV·'XWLHVµ 
Can.Bus.L.J. 337 at 345. 
8 Teck Corp. v. Millar (1972), 33 D.L.R (3d) 288 (B.S.S.C.), [1973] 2 W.W.R. 385 [Teck cited 
to D.L.R.].
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cant amount of power yielded by directors. Due to directors exercising a 
level of control “which rises above day-to-day accountability to owning 
shareholders and which comes under some scrutiny only at annual gen-
eral or at special meetings,”9DÀGXFLDU\GXW\LVWKHEHVWLQVWUXPHQWIRU
keeping their powers in check.
Shareholder primacy refers to the fact that the interests of the corpo-
ration generally coincide with the interests of the shareholders; namely, 
PD[LPL]DWLRQRIVKDUHYDOXH7KXV WKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\KDVEHHQ LQWHU-
preted as a duty towards the shareholders collectively, that is, “all of the 
shareholders, taking no one sectional interest to prevail over the oth-
ers.”10,QWU\LQJWRGHWHUPLQHZKDWWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\UHTXLUHVLQDQ\SDU-
ticular case, the court must both consider what the shareholders would 
KDYH DJUHHG WR LI WKH\ KDG EHHQ SHUPLWWHG WR EDUJDLQ DQG GHÀQH WKH
interests of the corporation in the circumstances.11 A court will simply 
ask: “what was the primary or governing purpose of the directors’ ac-
tion?”12 It will then only intervene if the directors’ purpose is improper 
and does not serve the interests of the corporation. If the directors can-
not prove that they acted on reasonable grounds and in the best interest 
RIWKHFRPSDQ\WKHQDFRXUWZLOOEHMXVWLÀHGLQÀQGLQJWKDWWKHGLUHFWRUV
acted for an improper purpose.13
The shareholder-primacy rule does not preclude management from 
taking into account the effect of a particular action on other stakehold-
ers, however. No corporation will maximize share value if it ignores the 
interests of other stakeholders, including creditors. Some propose a more 
formalized duty towards the other stakeholders. However, this would 
seem to be both unworkable and somewhat redundant, given that when 
a business is operating successfully, other stakeholders interests are in-
cidentally promoted.14 The existing shareholder-primacy norm already 
allows a high degree of management discretion. It allows directors to 
9 Canadian Aero Services v. O’Malley and Zarzycki, [1974] S.C.R. 592, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371, 11 
C.P.R. (2d) 206 [Canadian Aero Services cited to S.C.R.]. See also Carol Hansell, What Direc-
tors need to Know – Corporate Governance 2003 (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) at 98-99. 
10 Palmer v. Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Canada Ltd. (1989), 67 O.R. (2d) 161 at 168, 56 
D.L.R. (4th) 128 (Ont. S.C., Div. Ct.). 
11 Van Duzer, supra note 5 at 271. 
12 Teck, supra note 8 at 312. 
13 Teck, supra note 8 at 315-16. 
14 Van Duzer, supra note 5 at 444.
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take other stakeholder interests into account though not permitting them 
to abandon their primary goal of promoting shareholder interests.15
7KHSUREOHPVZKLFKDULVHRXWRIFRQÁLFWLQJLQWHUHVWVEHWZHHQVKDUH-
holders and other stakeholders have been dealt with rather hesitantly by 
Canadian courts.16 At some point, creditors may expect directors to ad-
GUHVVWKHLUVSHFLÀFLQWHUHVWV$VZLOOEHGLVFXVVHGWKHPRUHFRPSOLFDWHG
TXHVWLRQLV´LQDGGUHVVLQJWKRVHLQWHUHVWVVKRXOGWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\QRU-
mally owed to the corporation, shift towards other stakeholders.”17
III. THE IMPACT OF INSOLVENCY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
$VZHKDYHVHHQVRIDUGLUHFWRUVRZHDÀGXFLDU\GXW\WRWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ
as a whole to act with loyalty and in good faith. However, the question 
of how the usual duty of directors to act in the best interests of the cor-
poration is affected by the insolvency or near-insolvency of that corpo-
ration must still be addressed.18 In the event of insolvency, the question 
is whether these general rules are still applicable, or whether the duty 
of the directors must shift away from the corporation and towards other 
stakeholders, particularly creditors. In other words, when the company 
is insolvent, to whom should the directors owe a duty?
$FRGLÀFDWLRQRIWKHUHOHYDQWFRPPRQODZWHVWVRILQVROYHQF\LVODLG
down in section 2 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act19 (BIA), which 
stipulates that a corporation may be found to be insolvent, if:
(a) for any reason, the corporation is unable to meet its obligations 
if they generally become due;
15 Van Duzer, supra note 5 at 444. See also Bruce Welling et al., Canadian Corporate Law: 
Cases, Notes & Materials, 2nd ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2001) at 297. 
16 See for example Forsyth J.’s decision in Re Trizec Corp. [1994] 10 W.W.R. 127 (Alta. Q.B.) 
at 16, (1994), 158 A.R. 33, 21 Alta. L.R. (3d) 435, 20 B.L.R. (2d) 202, [1994] A.J. No. 577 [Re 
Trizec cited to W.W.R.].
17 See C. Graham W. King, “Extending Fiduciary Principles to the Director-Creditor Relation-
ship: A Canadian Perspective” (2002) 29 Man. L.J. 243. 
18 For a comprehensive discussion see Terence M. Dolan, “Bankruptcy and Insolvency Is-
sues” in M. Patricia Richardson, ed., 'LUHFWRUV·DQG2IÀFHUV·'XWLHVDQG/LDELOLWLHVLQ&DQDGD
(Markham: McCarthy Tétrault, 1997) at Chapter 11 and Andrew Keary “The Director’s Duty to 
Take into Account the Interests of Company Creditors: When is it triggered?” (2001) 25 Mel-
bourne U.L. Rev. 315 at 322 [Keary “Director’s Duty”]. 
19 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, [BIA]. 
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(b) the corporation has ceased paying its current obligations in the 
ordinary course of business as they generally become due; or
(c) the aggregate of the corporation’s property is not, at a fair 
YDOXDWLRQVXIÀFLHQWRULIGLVSRVHGRIDWDIDLUO\FRQGXFWHGVDOH
XQGHUOHJDOSURFHVVZRXOGQRWEHVXIÀFLHQWWRHQDEOHSD\PHQW
of the corporation’s obligations due and accruing due. 
When a company is insolvent or near-insolvent, there is little or no equi-
ty remaining. It is therefore arguable that the shareholders cease to have 
any material interest in the assets of the corporation at insolvency. The 
shareholders’ interests may be “considered dormant”20 since, for practi-
cal purposes, they have already lost their investment in the corporation 
as compared to the creditors, who still have a stake in the company. As 
the court in Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Property Limited explained:
in a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders 
entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company when 
questions of the duty of directors arise. … But where a company 
is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They become 
prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, 
to displace the power of the shareholders and directors to deal 
with the company’s assets. It is in a practical sense their assets 
and not the shareholders’ assets that, through the medium of the 
company, are under the management of the directors pending either 
liquidation, return to solvency, or the imposition of some alternative 
administration. [emphasis added] 21
In such a situation, does the directors’ duty—once owed to the corpora-
tion itself and its shareholders—shift towards the creditors, since they 
are the true stakeholders of an insolvent corporation? When a company 
becomes insolvent, do “the best interests of the corporation” still equal 
“the best interests of the shareholders,” or is it the best interests of the 
creditors that now must be given precedence? Before addressing this is-
sue, it will be helpful to outline the basic differences between sharehold-
ers’ and creditors’ interests when insolvency arises.
20 Wayne D. Gray “Peoples v. Wise and Dylex: Identifying Stakeholder Interests Upon or Near 
Corporate Insolvency – Stasis or Pragmatism?” (2003) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 242. 
21 Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Property Ltd. (in Liquidation) (1986), 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722 (C.A.), 
[Kinsela].
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At the insolvency stage, the shareholder stake in the company as-
sets appears to have less priority than the creditor stake. This creates 
an incentive for the shareholders to encourage the company to engage 
in risky investments or bargains. Directors may decide to gamble with 
what could end up being the creditors’ funds in the hope of rescuing the 
FRPSDQ\2ULIWKHFRPSDQ\·VÀQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQLVQRW\HWDSSDUHQWWR
outsiders, the directors may decide to take on additional debt in order to 
pay off the interests of already existing creditors. If either of these strat-
egies succeeds, the corporation will recover and the shareholder value 
will rise. If the strategies fail, the market value of the company will fall; 
however, since the shareholders will have already lost their money, it is 
the creditors who will bear the loss from the directors’ decisions during 
insolvency.22,QVXPPDU\́ WKHRQVHWRILQVROYHQF\VXIÀFLHQWO\DOWHUVWKH
motivation of the company and the relative gains of externalising the 
cost of debt to create uncompensated risk for the creditors.”23 
The creditors, unlike the shareholders will be more interested in 
conservative investments which would preserve the remaining assets of 
the company. The traditional argument is that it is the creditors’ respon-
sibility to manage the risks which arise out of the corporation’s insol-
vency since they have the ability to protect their interests. For example, 
creditors have the means to bargain effectively by negotiating contracts 
which include safeguards such as secured creditor status or increased 
rates of interest.247KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\WUXHIRUODUJHÀQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
Where creditors fail to negotiate properly, directors should not serve as 
insurers against their poor business judgment. Creditors’ interests can 
be distinguished from shareholders’ interests because of the fact that 
the shareholders’ claims vary with the success of the business, while 
RWKHUFODLPVHVSHFLDOO\WKRVHRIWKHFUHGLWRUVDUHÀ[HG25 The argument 
22 David Thomson, “Directors, Creditors and Insolvency: A Fiduciary Duty or a Duty Not to 
Oppress?” (2000) 58 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 31 at 33. 
23 Stéphane Rousseau, “The Duties of Directors of Financially Distressed Corporations: A 
Québec Perspective on the Peoples Case” (2004) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 368 at 382. 
24 Brian Morgan and Harry Underwood, “Directors’ Liability to Creditors on a Corporations’ 
Insolvency in Light of the Dylex and Peoples Department Stores Litigation” (2004) 39 Can.Bus.
L.J. 336 at 338. See also Andrew Keary “Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns 
5HODWLQJWR(IÀFLHQF\DQG2YHU3URWHFWLRQRI&UHGLWRUVµ0RG/5HYDW
[Keary “Contractarian Concerns”]. 
25 Van Duzer, supra note 5 at 445.
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DJDLQVWWKHQHHGIRUDÀGXFLDU\GXW\WRZDUGVFUHGLWRUVLVEROVWHUHGE\
legislation, such as the BIA and section 241(2)(c) of the CBCA (the so-
called “oppression remedy”), which accounts for creditors’ interests.
The argument against the protection of creditors’ interests, however, 
falters on a critical fact; simply put, it is often true that by the time insol-
vency law becomes relevant, there are few assets remaining that the cre-
ditors can salvage. It is important to remember that the contract intended 
WRVDIHJXDUGFUHGLWRUVZLOORQO\UHÁHFW WKHULVNVSHUFHLYHGDW WKH WLPH
the negotiations were entered into, and may fail to be effective against 
unforeseen risks. A question then arises as to whether these common 
traps of contractual protection are enough to justify the establishment 
RIDQHZÀGXFLDU\GXW\IRUGLUHFWRUVWRZDUGVFUHGLWRUVLQWKHHYHQWRI
potential or actual insolvency. The corollary to this proposal is that once 
ÀGXFLDU\GXW\WRZDUGVFUHGLWRUVLVIRXQGWRH[LVWRQHPXVWWKHQGHWHU-
mine at what precise time this duty should arise. Must the corporation 
be truly and deeply insolvent, or is it enough if the corporation is “at the 
vicinity of insolvency,” a phrase used by some commentators which is 
itself problematic for its lack of precision.26$WWHPSWLQJWRÀQGWKHH[DFW
point in a corporation’s life where only the creditors have an economic 
interest in the company amounts to an almost insoluble problem. As 
Christopher Nicholls explains: 
it brings to mind a variation of Zeno’s paradox…before a company 
becomes insolvent, there must be an earlier moment when it is almost 
insolvent. Before that moment, there must be still an earlier point in 
WLPHZKHQWKHÀUPLValmost almost insolvent. And so on.27
$QH[WHQVLRQRIWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\WRZDUGVFUHGLWRUVWKXVVHHPVQRWRQO\
unnecessary, as there are already creditor protection mechanisms avail-
able, but may also lead to the problem described above, that is, deter-
mining when exactly the duty would be triggered. Another possible so-
lution would be the creation of a directors’ duty towards the company’s 
creditors at all times when making business decisions. This however, 
would put too high a stress on directors: not only would they have to 
26 See, for example, Edward M. Iacobucci, “Directors’ Duties in Insolvency: Clarifying what is 
at Stake” (2003) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 398 at 408. 
27 &KULVWRSKHU &1LFKROOV ´/LDELOLW\ RI &RUSRUDWH2IÀFHUV DQG'LUHFWRUV WR7KLUG 3DUWLHVµ
(2001) 35 Can. Bus. L.J. 1 at 34. See also Keary “Director’s Duty”, supra note 18 at 326-27. 
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act in the interests of the corporation, but they would also have to take 
into account the interests of the creditors which, as we have seen, might 
be very different from the company’s interests. Indeed, it can be argued 
that having to balance all the stakeholders’ interests at all times would 
cause directors to act too conservatively, out of fear they may breach 
their duty to at least one group of stakeholders. This uncertainty might 
make directors avoid making the kind of resolute decisions that are re-
TXLUHGWRPD[LPLVHSURÀWVDQGVKDUHKROGHUYDOXH28 In other words, “in-
HIÀFLHQFLHVPD\UHVXOWLQVRIDUDVPDQDJHUVVK\DZD\IURPGHFLVLRQV
fail to trade or assume responsibilities, desist from establishing effective 
lines of control and delegate decisions to parties less well positioned to 
decide relevant issues.”29 Thus, it would seem that the imposition of a 
new duty on directors is not the solution to the problem, nor would a 
new duty lead to better corporate management. Rather, it would initiate 




the United Kingdom has dealt with the question of whether directors 
VKRXOGRZHDÀGXFLDU\GXW\WRZDUGVFUHGLWRUVDQGLIVRZKHQWKLVGXW\
will arise. It should be noted that the approaches generally employed in 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions contrast sharply with the practice of 
Canadian jurisprudence which, until recently, has been more reluctant 
to recognize a duty.
A review of existing case law reveals that other Commonwealth 
courts have taken divergent views on the nature of the duty owed by di-
rectors to creditors. They have tended to take one of two stances on the 
LVVXHVRPHFRXUWVSHUFHLYHWKHGXW\DVDQDVSHFWRIWKHWUDGLWLRQDOÀGX-
ciary duty to act honestly and in good faith in the interests of the corpo-
ration. Other courts tend to see it as an independent duty owed directly 
to creditors founded either on ordinary principles of directors’ duty of 
28 Keary, “Contractarian Concerns” supra note 24 at 681. 
29 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge: Uni-
versity Press, 2002) at 544. 
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care.30 Both of these approaches are relatively recent. The traditional ap-
proach to directors’ duties has been to include the shareholders’ interests 
and to exclude the interests of the creditors. Indeed, creditors’ interests 
have been excluded from the duty even where the creditors’ stake in the 
company’s assets is much larger than the shareholders’ stake, which is 
often the case in most modern businesses.31 
This view changed radically in 1976, when Mason J. in the High 
Court of Australia case of Walker v. Wimborne held that, “the directors 
of a company in discharging their duty to the company must take ac-
count of the interests of its shareholders and its creditors.”32 Mason J. 
emphasized that the best interests of the company was not restricted 
to shareholder interests but included creditors’ interests as well. In dis-
charging their duty to the corporation, directors should have regard both 
for the interests of the company and its creditors. Mason J’s judgment 
should not be overstated. A duty owed to creditors directly and individu-
ally was not established in this case. Rather, Walker v. Wimborne seems 
to stand for the similar ratio as in Kinsela. Street C.J. in Kinsela writes: 
“the directors’ duty to a company as a whole extends in an insolvency 
context to not prejudicing the interests of creditors.”33 Both Walker v. 
Wimborne and Kinsela seem to indicate that insolvency only alters the 
relative weight given to shareholders’ interests as opposed to creditors’ 
LQWHUHVWV EXW GRHV QRW JLYH ULVH WR D VHSDUDWH ÀGXFLDU\ GXW\ RZHG WR
creditors. 
The New Zealand courts have also considered this issue. In the 1995 
case, Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd,. WKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOÀUVWHP-
phasized that:
the duties of directors are owed to the company. On the facts of 
particular cases this may require the directors to consider inter 
alia the interests of creditors. For instance, creditors are entitled to 
consideration, in my opinion, if the company is insolvent, or nearly 
insolvent, or of doubtful solvency, or if a contemplated payment or 
other course of action would jeopardize its solvency. 34
30 Ibid. at 499. 
31 See Jacob Ziegel, “Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution – An Anglo-
Canadian Perspective” (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 511 at 517. 
32 [1976] 50 A.L.J.R. 446 at 449.
33Kinsela, supra note 21 at 732. 
34 [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 at 249. 
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Cooke J. went on to state that, “the directors of a company, when declar-
ing a dividend, owe a duty not only to the company but also to its credi-
tors”35. This statement leaves it somewhat unclear as to whether Cooke 
J. intended to create a separate duty owed to creditors, or whether the 
duty to creditors is part of the larger duty owed to the corporation gener-
ally. In the more recent case of Dairy Containers Ltd. v. NZI Bank Ltd.; 
Dairy Containers Ltd. v. Auditor-General however, Thomas J. cleared 
up some of the ambiguity when he held that, “a company owes a duty to 
creditors at least where the company is insolvent or nearly so.”36 From 
this jurisprudence, it seems that the New Zealand courts have held that 
the interests of an insolvent (or almost insolvent company) are in fact 
the interests of existing creditors.
In the United Kingdom, jurisprudence has gone a long way toward 
recognizing that the best interests of the corporation may include more 
than simply the rights of the shareholders. Moreover, several decisions 
show that creditors have been recognized as legitimate stakeholders in a 
corporation that is insolvent or nearly insolvent. Yet, as we have seen in 
other jurisdictions, the United Kingdom courts have struggled with the 
nature of this duty. Do directors owe a direct duty to creditors, or is this 
duty subsumed under the broader duty owed to the company? Buckley 
L.J. in Horsley & Weight Ltd. (Re), points out that:
[i]t is a misapprehension to suppose that the directors of a company 
owe a duty to the company’s creditors to keep the contributed 
capital of the company intact….It may be somewhat loosely said 
that the directors owe an indirect duty to the creditors not to permit 
any unlawful reduction of capital to occur, but I would regard it as 
more accurate to say that the directors owe a duty to the company 
in this respect. 37
In contrast, Lord Templeman stated in Winkworth v. Edward Baron De-
velopment Co. Ltd. that in his opinion:
the company owes a duty to its creditors to keep its property inviolate 
and available for the repayment of its debts….A duty is owed to by 
the directors to the company and to the creditors of the company to 
35 Ibid. 
36 N.Z.L.R. 701 (H.C.) at 216-17 (1994) (Lexis). 
37 [1982] 1 Ch. 442 (C.A.) at 453-54. 
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ensure that the affairs of the company are properly administered and 
WKDWLWVSURSHUW\LVQRWGLVVLSDWHGRUH[SORLWHGIRUWKHEHQHÀWRIWKH
directors themselves to the prejudice of the creditors.38 
Lord Templeman, unlike Buckley L.J., seems to recognise a direct duty 
owed to creditors, in addition to the general duty owed to the corporation 
LWVHOI+RZHYHUKHGRHVQRWIUDPHWKLVGXW\DVÀGXFLDU\UDWKHU/RUG
Templeman considers the duty to arise out of contractual obligations.39 
7KLVZDVDOVRFODULÀHGLQWKH+RXVHRI/RUGVGHFLVLRQLQKuwait Asia 
Bank EC v. National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd.40 and in the more recent 
case of Yukong Line Ltd. of Korea v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. of 
Liberia, where Toulson J. explicitly rejected the possibility of a direct 
duty owed to creditors. He ruled that: 
,QP\MXGJPHQWKHGRHVQRWRZHDGLUHFWÀGXFLDU\GXW\WRZDUGVDQ
individual creditor, nor is an individual creditor entitled to sue for 
EUHDFKRIWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\RZHGE\WKHGLUHFWRUWRWKHFRPSDQ\41
To summarize, in the United Kingdom the prevailing view seems to be 
WKDWWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\LVRZHGRQO\WRWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ+RZHYHULQWKH
event of near insolvency, directors should also take into account the in-
terests of creditors. Accounting for creditors’ interests is “part and par-
cel of the more general duty owed by directors to act in the best interests 
of the corporation.”42 
The experience in Australia, New Zealand and The United Kingdom 
contrasts sharply with the Canadian jurisprudence detailed below.
V. CANADIAN JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Since the 1885 case of Bank of Toronto v. Cobourg, Peterborough and 
Marmora Railway Co.43 it was settled law in Canada that directors owe 
QRGXWLHVWRWKHFUHGLWRUVRIDFRUSRUDWLRQ1RÀGXFLDU\RUWUXVWUHODWLRQ
38 [1987] 1 All. E.R. 114 (H.L.) at 118. 
39 See also Thomson, supra note 22 at 42. 
40 [1990] 3 All E.R. 404.
41 [1998] 4 All E.R. 82 (Q.B.D.) at 99. 
42 Morgan and Underwood, supra note 24 at 347-48. 
43 (1885) 10 O.R. 376 (Ch.). 
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existed between these two parties, and this traditional view had been 
followed by the courts for almost 110 years. However, in 1994 the case 
of Re Trizec Corp.44 seemed to signal a move away from the conven-
tional analysis. Forsyth J. wrote: 
«D VSHFLÀF GXW\ WR VKDUHKROGHUV EHFRPHV LQWHUPLQJOHG ZLWK D
duty to creditors when the ability of a company to pay its debts 
EHFRPHVTXHVWLRQDEOH+RZHYHUDZKROHVDOH WUDQVIHURIÀGXFLDU\
duty to creditors does not occur at the stage of proceedings where 
an arrangement is sought as opposed to a case where liquidation 
occurs.45
This passage seems to suggest that whenever there is a transition from 
VROYHQF\ WR LQVROYHQF\ WKHUH LVDOVRDVKLIW LQ WKHGLUHFWRUV·ÀGXFLDU\
duty, from being owed to the corporation itself to being owed to the 
creditors. Consequently, directors are required to balance both the inter-
ests of the creditors and the company when making business decisions. 
Unfortunately, Forsyth J. did not elaborate on this point. He did not 
H[SODLQKRZGLUHFWRUVZRXOGUHFRQFLOHFRQÁLFWLQJLQWHUHVWVRIFUHGLWRUV
and shareholders. Although the judgment was a marked departure from 
previous case law, this hesitant and rather vague Canadian approach 
could hardly be considered a landmark decision when compared to the 
clear judgments by the other Commonwealth courts. 
1. Peoples – the Trial Decision
Following the tentative decision in Re Trizec Corp, the bold decision of 
the Québec Superior Court in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee 
of) v. Wise46 in 1998 seemed to change the landscape drastically. The 
case arose out of the bankruptcy of Wise Stores Inc. (“Wise”) and its 
wholly owned subsidiary Peoples Department Stores Inc. (“Peoples”). 
The trustee in bankruptcy of Peoples brought an action against the three 
:LVHEURWKHUVZKRZHUHPDMRULW\ VKDUHKROGHUVRIÀFHUVDQGGLUHFWRUV
of Wise, and the only directors of Peoples. The trustee claimed that the 
Wise brothers, as directors of Peoples, had favoured the interests of 
44 Re Trizec, supra note 16. 
45 Re Trizec, supra note 16 at 139. 
46 Peoples (QSC), supra note 1. 
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Wise over Peoples to the detriment of Peoples’ creditors. The trustee 
advanced the argument that the Wises’ actions amounted to a breach 
of their duties as directors under section 122 (1) of the CBCA. Green-
berg J. agreed with this argument and found the Wise brothers liable 
IRUEUHDFKRIWKHLUÀGXFLDU\GXW\,QVRÀQGLQJKHUHOLHGKHDYLO\RQWKH
&RPPRQZHDOWKGHFLVLRQVUHIHUUHGWRDERYHDQGKHOGWKDWWKHÀGXFLDU\
duty under section 122 (1) (a) of the CBCA extends to the creditors of a 
company when the company is insolvent or in the vicinity of insolvency. 
He clearly favoured the school of thought which contends that the credi-
tors replace the shareholders as the true stakeholders of the corporation 
ZKHQWKHÀQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQQHDUVLQVROYHQF\*UHHQEHUJ-VHHPHGWR
follow the propositions made by Jacob Ziegel, who as early as 1993 had 
opined on this issue:
…at least where a company is insolvent or near to insolvency, …the 
directors’ duties lie not only towards the companies shareholders, but 
that they also are bound to act in the best interests of the company’s 
FUHGLWRUV«>,@W LV QRW XQUHDVRQDEOH LQ H[FKDQJH IRU WKH EHQHÀW
RI OLPLWHG OLDELOLW\ WR LPSRVH D GXW\ RQ GLUHFWRUV QRW WR VDFULÀFH
creditors’ interests when the going gets rough….If the company 
is insolvent, only the creditors still have a meaningful stake in its 
assets.47
While he recognized the need to provide some form of protection for 
FUHGLWRUVLQÀQDQFLDOO\GLVWUHVVHGFRUSRUDWLRQV*UHHQEHUJ-GLGQRWUH-
veal the precise nature of the duty. He left open to interpretation whether 
insolvency leads to a separate duty owed directly to creditors, or wheth-
er insolvency simply changes the way in which the duty owed to the 
company should be displayed. Nevertheless, he referred strongly to the 
development in other Commonwealth countries and made it obvious 
that “Canadian Corporate Law should evolve in that direction.”48
2. Peoples – the Appellate Decision
The Wise brothers appealed to the Québec Court of Appeal. Pelletier 
J.A., writing for the Court, reversed the decision of Greenberg J. on all 
47 Supra note 31 at 511 and 530. 
48 Peoples (QSC), supra note 1 at 200. 
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counts.49 Pelletier J.A. refused to accept Greenberg J.’s opinion that in 
an insolvent or almost insolvent corporation the interests of creditors are 
equal to the best interests of the corporation. He explicitly rejected the 
shift of duty proposed by Greenberg J.. Pelletier J. A. reasoned that there 
was nothing in the history of the CBCA to justify an expansion of direc-
tors’ liability to third parties. He wrote that “it was not the role of the 
judiciary to modify the traditional meaning given to the expression ‘the 
best interest of the corporation’ in order to create a new liability regime, 
since this was the jurisdiction of the legislator.”50 Pelletier J.A. did, on 
the other hand, recognize that the creditors’ interests in the management 
of a corporation might increase as the corporation nears bankruptcy.51 
Most importantly, Pelletier J.A. held that the duty of directors to act in 
the best interests of the corporation requires that they protect the le-
gitimate interests of all the shareholders. In effect, the Court of Appeal 
recognized that in the event or in the vicinity of insolvency the interests 
of creditors gain importance, but clearly refrained from extending the 
ÀGXFLDU\ GXW\ RZHG WR WKH FRUSRUDWLRQ WRZDUGV D OHJDO SURWHFWLRQ RI
creditors’ interests.52 
3. Peoples – the Supreme Court of Canada Decision
The trustee sought leave appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which 
was granted on August 28, 2003.53 On Friday October 29, 2004 Major 
and Deschamps JJ., writing for the Court, dismissed the appeal and held 
in favour of the three Wise brothers. They wrote:
>L@QVRIDUDVWKHVWDWXWRU\ÀGXFLDU\GXW\LVFRQFHUQHGLWLVFOHDUWKDW
the phrase the ‘best interests of the corporation’ should not be read 
simply as the ‘best interests of the shareholders’. From an economic 
perspective, the ‘best interests of the corporation’ means the 
maximization of the value of the corporation. However, the courts 
have long recognized that various other factors may be relevant in 
determining what directors should consider in soundly managing 
49 Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise (2003), 224 D.L.R. (4th) 509, 41 C.B.R. 
(4th) 225 (Que. C.A.). 
50 See also Rousseau, supra note 23 at 390. 
51 Rousseau, supra note 23 at 79. 
52 See also Morgan and Underwood, supra note 24 at 357-58. 
53 [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 133. 
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with a view to the best interests of the corporation….The various 
shifts in interests that naturally occur as a corporation’s fortunes 
ULVHDQGIDOOGRQRWKRZHYHUDIIHFWWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\
XQGHUVDRIWKH&%&$$WDOOWLPHVGLUHFWRUVDQGRIÀFHUV
RZH WKHLUÀGXFLDU\REOLJDWLRQ WR WKHFRUSRUDWLRQ7KH LQWHUHVWVRI
the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of creditors 
or those of any other stakeholders. [emphasis added] 54
The Supreme Court thus explicitly distanced itself from the other Com-
monwealth jurisprudence, which recognizes a shift in the duty whenev-
er a corporation enters a state of insolvency. Rather, the Supreme Court 
states that in resolving competing shareholders’ and creditors’ interests, 
directors are obliged to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the 
best interests of the corporation, and that they must be careful not to fa-
vour the interests of any one group of stakeholders. Where it is evident 
that the purpose of the directors was to create a “better” company, they 
will not be held liable for breach of duty. This will be the case even if 
their attempt is unsuccessful, and regardless of whether the corpora-
tion is in the “nebulous vicinity of insolvency”. The court found that 
WKLVSKUDVHLV´LQFDSDEOHRIGHÀQLWLRQDQGKDVQROHJDOPHDQLQJµ55 Ma-
jor and Deschamps JJ. clearly rejected the need to read the interests of 
FUHGLWRUVLQWRWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\XQGHUVHFWLRQDRIWKH&%&$
They pointed to the availability of other means through which the stake-
holders can protect their interests. One example of such a tool is he op-
pression remedy in section 241 (2) (c) of the CBCA, which is unique to 
the Canadian legal landscape. The decision of Major and Deschamps JJ. 
FODULÀHVWKLVSRLQW
Creditors are only one set of stakeholders, but their interests are 
protected in a number of ways….The oppression remedy of s. 
241 (2) (c) of the CBCA and the similar provisions of provincial 
legislation regarding corporations grant the broadest rights to 
creditors of any common law jurisdiction….The fact that creditors’ 
LQWHUHVWVLQFUHDVHLQUHOHYDQF\DVDFRUSRUDWLRQ·VÀQDQFHVGHWHULRUDWH
is apt to be relevant to, inter alia, the exercise of discretion by a 
court in granting standing to a party as a “complainant” under s. 238 
(d) of the CBCA as a proper person. 56
54 Peoples (SCC), supra note 2 at paras. 42-43. 
55 Ibid. at para. 46. 
56 Ibid. at paras. 48-49. 
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In most countries, the statutory remedies are available only to members 
of the corporation, to shareholders only.57 By underlining the importance 
of the oppression remedy, The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledges 
the differences between Canadian and Commonwealth legislative rem-
edies, and this decision leads the way for future cases concerning di-
rectors’ liability towards creditors. Due to this landmark decision, the 
courts will most likely have to consider the question of whether a credi-
WRUIDOOVZLWKLQWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI´FRPSODLQDQWµIRXQGLQVHFWLRQRI
the CBCA. In light of the Supreme Court decision, Canadians may well 
see the courts become more willing to recognize creditors’ standing as 
complainants. Given the importance of the oppression remedy, a brief 
overview of that remedy and its availability to creditors of a corporation 
follows below.
VI. THE OPPRESSION REMEDY
Since its introduction as part of the CBCA in 1975, the oppression rem-
edy has been described as the broadest, most comprehensive and most 
open-ended remedy in the common law world. Through the means of 
this statutory remedy, shareholders and certain other corporate stake-
holders can ensure that their interests are fairly protected in the con-
text of corporate action and decision making.58 ,W KDV LQÁXHQFHG QRW
only the content of a claim for relief, but also who may claim relief and 
what remedies can be sought. The more traditional remedies, such as the 
VKDUHKROGHUV·GHULYDWLYHDFWLRQKDYHEHHQVLJQLÀFDQWO\GLVSODFHGE\WKH
ÁH[LEOHDQGSURFHGXUDOO\VLPSOHRSSUHVVLRQDFWLRQ59 Due to the recent 
recognition given to creditors by the Supreme Court in Peoples, in this 
section I focus on the term “complainant” itself rather than explain in 
which circumstances the powers of the directors of a corporation have 
been exercised in a manner that is “oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to 
or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder [or] credi-
tor,” as per section 241 of the CBCA. 
57 See for example the Australian Corporations Act 2001, chapter 2F, part 2F.1, section 235. 
58 G. Blair Cowper-Smith, “Shareholders’ Statutory Remedies“ in M. Patricia Richardson, ed., 
'LUHFWRUV·DQG2IÀFHUV·'XWLHVDQG/LDELOLWLHVLQ&DQDGD(Markham: McCarthy Tétrault, 1997) 
at 75. 
59 Van Duzer, supra note 5 at 327. See also King, supra note 17 at 256. 
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The key provisions in the CBCA are sections 238, 241 and 242, and 
DVQRWHG VHFWLRQRI WKH&%&$GHÀQHV WKH FODVVRISHUVRQV HQWL-





son who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an ap-
plication under this Part.” 
Major and Deschamps JJ. stressed creditors’ interests increase as 
a corporation nears insolvency. This should impact the discretion of a 
court when granting standing to a creditor as a “proper person” under 
paragraph 238 (d) of the CBCA. By doing so, both secured and un-
secured creditors are recognized as possible parties to an oppression 
action. This explicit inclusion of creditors stands in contrast to the tra-
ditional reluctance of the courts to exercise their discretion to permit 
an action brought by a creditor, even though section 241 (2) expressly 
refers to the interests of creditors. In most of the instances in which 
creditors have been denied standing, it was argued that the creditor’s 
interest in the affairs of the corporation was too remote, that the credi-
tor was not in a position analogous to that of a minority shareholder, or 
that the creditor had no particular legitimate interest in the management 
of the company.60 Given that creditors can now gain standing, directors 
of insolvent companies may be personally liable under the oppression 
remedy if creditors are treated unfairly, even if the directors made their 
best efforts to act in the best interests of the company. The decisions of 
the directors must have a proper corporate purpose that takes into ac-
count the reasonable expectations of the corporation’s creditors in the 
circumstances under consideration. 
Although this development challenges traditional corporate law 
notions about who corporate managers are responsible to the Supreme 
Court decision should not be seen as a defeat of creditors’ interests. 
Rather, it can be seen as an enhancement to the position of creditors 
when they are seeking relief under the oppression remedy. Historically, 
a creditor has only been considered a “proper person” if the conduct of 
60 For a good summary of existing case law see Ziegel, supra note 31 at 528-29 and Thomson, 
supra note 22 at 50-51, as well as VanDuzer, supra note 5 at 337-340.
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the directors constituted a breach of the underlying expectation aris-
ing from the circumstances in which the creditor’s relationship with the 
corporation arose. After Peoples, it is clear that granting standing to a 
creditor complainant becomes increasingly likely as the corporation’s 
ÀQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQGHWHULRUDWHV7KHUHIRUHWKHRSSUHVVLRQUHPHG\FDQEH
seen as a better instrument for protecting creditors’ interests than a claim 
RIEUHDFKRIÀGXFLDU\GXW\XQGHUVHFWLRQDRIWKH&%&$7KH
RSSUHVVLRQUHPHG\XQOLNHVXLQJIRUDEUHDFKRIÀGXFLDU\GXW\DYRLGV
the onerous determination of the precise point in time when the corpora-
tion is “nearing insolvency”. Expectedly, the protection offered by the 
oppression remedy does not depend on the state of solvency at all, but it 
is, “triggered by the oppressive conduct alone and not by some combi-
nation of dereliction of duty and near-insolvency.”61 
One might argue that the broad scope of the oppression remedy is 
an incentive for creditors to convert every action against the corpora-
tion into an oppression action. But given the fact that creditors do not 
have standing as of right to bring an oppression remedy in every situa-
tion, such an outcome is very unlikely. It is still at the discretion of the 
court to grant creditors standing as a complainant under section 238 of 
the CBCA, however, in light of Peoples, a creditor’s chances of being 
JUDQWHGVWDQGLQJLQFUHDVHZKHQWKHFRUSRUDWLRQLVLQÀQDQFLDOGLVWUHVV
The need to consider one’s chances of being granted status as a com-
plainant will prevent claimants from abusing the broad discretionary 
remedies. 
The Supreme Court of Canada obviously took these nuanced issues 
into account when they spoke in favour of the oppression remedy and 
ZKHQWKH\UHMHFWHGWKHH[WHQVLRQRIWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\WRFUHGLWRUV7KH
Supreme Court has presented the oppression remedy as a workable so-
lution which balances the need for creditor protection on the one hand, 
while protecting directors discretion from constant potential liability on 
the other. 
61 Thomson, supra note 22 at 48. 
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Peoples has given a clear 
direction for future developments in the area of directors’ duties. The 
FKRLFHKDVEHHQEHWZHHQGHYHORSLQJWKHODZRIGLUHFWRUV·ÀGXFLDU\GX-
WLHVWRLQFOXGHDGXW\EHQHÀWLQJFUHGLWRUVLQWKHHYHQWRILQVROYHQF\RU
near insolvency, or using the oppression remedy as a means to protect 
creditors’ interests. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that 
by the time creditors can make use of their traditional contractual or 
insolvency remedies there is often little money left in the corporation, 
it has nonetheless ruled in favour of the oppression remedy and against 
WKHH[WHQVLRQRI WKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\WRZDUGVFRUSRUDWHFUHGLWRUV,WKDV
HPSKDVL]HG WKDWGLUHFWRUVRZH WKHFRPPRQ ODZÀGXFLDU\GXW\ WR WKH
corporation only, and that one must be careful not to intermingle credi-
tors’ interests with those of the company.
A review of the Supreme Court’s decision in this case supports the 
conclusion that it is a balanced and appropriate ruling. Stated simply, 
acknowledgement of a duty owed by directors to take account of the 
interests of creditors when the corporation is insolvent or nearing insol-
vency is not necessary for the protection of creditors’ interests. A distinct 
duty owed to creditors would have put them in a better position than the 
shareholders who do not have any contractual remedies if the corpora-
tion fails and they lose their investments. Moreover, the danger of such 
a statutory duty is that directors might start to act overly cautious, and 
fail to take even the most reasonable risks.62 In any case, the oppression 
UHPHG\LVVXIÀFLHQWO\EURDGWRFDSWXUHDOOGLUHFWRULDOEHKDYLRXUWKDWZDV
not in the best interests of the corporation. In a sense, it is even broader 
LQVFRSHWKDQWKHÀGXFLDU\GXW\:KLOHEDGIDLWKLVDUHTXLUHPHQWIRUDQ
DFWLRQDEOHEUHDFKRIÀGXFLDU\GXW\KRZHYHULWLVQRWDQHVVHQWLDOHOH-
ment for an oppression action, and such an action can consequently be 
applied to a much broader spectrum of behaviour.63 It would have been 
VXSHUÁXRXVWRGHYHORSDZKROHQHZFRQFHSWRIÀGXFLDU\GXW\IRU WKH
protection of creditors given that their interests are already protected.
62 See also Keary “Contractarian Concerns”, supra note 24 at 682-83. 
63-DQLV6DUUD́ 7KH&RUSRUDWH9HLO/LIWHG'LUHFWRUDQG2IÀFHU/LDELOLW\WR7KLUG3DUWLHVµ
35 Can. Bus. L.J. 55 at 62. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada has demonstrated Canadian independ-
ence from the Commonwealth jurisprudence and has acknowledged the 
uniquely broad statutory oppression remedy available in Canada as a 
VXIÀFLHQW WRRO IRU FUHGLWRU SURWHFWLRQ ,W FRQÀUPV WKH WUDGLWLRQDO FRU-
porate notion that directors owe their duties only to the corporation, 
UHJDUGOHVVRIWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ·VÀQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQDQGLWSURYLGHVDUHVR-
lution for Canadian corporate directors with regards to whose interests 
should be privileged while making business decisions. 
